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75 
How Not to Use the Involuntary Bankruptcy Process 
Michael A. Friedman, Esq. and Allison R. Day*  
In November 2008, Lyon Financial Services, Inc., a subsidiary of U.S. 
Bank, N.A., filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against 
Maury Rosenberg and his affiliated medical-imaging businesses.1 The 
involuntary bankruptcy filing was part of a larger dispute between 
Rosenberg, U.S. Bank, and their respective affiliates that, by mid-2016, 
had “produced 27 written opinions at almost every level of the federal 
judiciary.”2 Several of those written opinions addressed issues of first 
impression under 11 U.S.C. § 303, the section of the Bankruptcy Code that 
governs involuntary bankruptcies. This Article provides an overview of 
issues that may arise when an involuntary bankruptcy petition is 
wrongfully filed and dismissed, using the facts and decisions in the 
Rosenberg case as a cautionary tale for would-be petitioning creditors.   
 
I. THE ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FILING  
AN INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY 
 
Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code contains three requirements for 
commencing an involuntary bankruptcy case: (1) there must be three or 
more petitioning creditors; (2) each petitioning creditor must hold a claim 
against the debtor that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a 
bona fide dispute as to liability or amount; and (3) the claims must 
aggregate at least $15,775 more than the value of liens on the debtor’s 
property.3 Each eligibility requirement is critical because if any is missing 
then “the petitioning creditors lack standing, the bankruptcy court lacks 
jurisdiction over the case, and thus the involuntary case must be 
 
*  Michael A. Friedman, Esq. and Allison R. Day are partners at Genovese, Joblove & Battista, 
P.A., in Miami, Florida. Ms. Day focuses her practice on representing debtors, creditors and trustees in 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases as well as representing receivers in both federal and state court and 
both assignor and assignees in assignment for the benefit of creditors proceedings. Mr. Friedman 
focuses his practice on litigation stemming from all types of insolvency scenarios. 
1. See In re Rosenberg, 414 B.R. 826 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 472 F. App’x 890 (11th Cir. 
2012). 
2. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivable XVII, LLC, 835 F.3d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 2016).  
3. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (2006) (these numbers have been adjusted for inflation per 11 U.S.C. § 
104). If the debtor has fewer than twelve eligible creditors, then only one unsecured creditor with a 
qualifying claim is needed. Id. Assuming that the involuntary petition satisfies these requirements, the 
petitioning creditors still must prove that “the debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as 
such debts become due,” a fact-sensitive issue. Id. § 303(h)(1).  
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dismissed.” 4  
In Rosenberg, the bankruptcy court determined that the petitioning 
creditors failed to satisfy the eligibility requirements in several ways. The 
facts in Rosenberg were complex, so a little background is necessary. Prior 
to the bankruptcy filing, certain limited partnerships, the NMI LPs, entered 
into leases to finance the purchase of business equipment. Rosenberg, who 
was affiliated with the NMI LPs, executed a personal guaranty to secure 
payment of the lease obligations. The leases were then assigned to five 
special purpose entities, the DVI Entities, which were created to engage in 
a securitization transaction that financed the purchase of the equipment by 
issuing notes.5  Those special purpose entities assigned their rights in the 
leases to U.S. Bank, as trustee for the noteholders.6 Lyon Financial 
Services, Inc. (Lyon), a subsidiary of U.S. Bank, was the servicer for the 
leases.7  
In 2005, as part of a settlement that resolved a dispute concerning the 
leases, Rosenberg executed a limited personal guaranty in favor of Lyon 
that superseded his prior guaranty, and also signed a confession of 
judgment in favor of Lyon.8 The DVI Entities were not parties to the 
settlement; Rosenberg’s obligations under the limited guaranty ran solely 
to Lyon, and only Lyon could demand performance of those obligations.9 
The director of operations of Lyon signed the settlement agreement for 
Lyon as servicer for the DVI Entities and agent for U.S. Bank.10 
In July 2008, Lyon (not the DVI Entities) sued Rosenberg in state court 
to enforce the limited guaranty based on the NMI LPs’ alleged breaches 
under the leases, and filed the confessed judgment.11 In August 2008, 
Lyon obtained a judgment against Rosenberg, but the state court stayed 
 
4. Rosenberg, 414 B.R. at 840; In re Charon, 94 B.R. 403, 405–06 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) 
(petitioner has “burden of proving that it satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of [section] 303(b)”); 
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 303.11[3], 303.14[9] (Resnick & Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (“The burden 
is on the petitioning creditor to establish a prima facie case that there is no bona fide dispute as to both 
liability and amount” and “the burden is on the petitioning creditor to prove they are qualified to file 
an involuntary petition.”). 
5. Rosenberg, 414 B.R. at 833–37. 
6. Id. at 833. 
7. Id. at 834.  
8. Id. at 834–35. 
9. Id. at 835–36. 
10. Id. at 835.  
11.  Id. at 836. 
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execution on the judgment at Rosenberg’s request pending resolution of a 
dispute concerning the amount owed under the limited guaranty.12 Then, in 
November 2008, Lyon’s director of operations filed an involuntary 
Chapter 7 petition against Rosenberg on behalf of the DVI Entities based 
on the limited guaranty.13 Lyon was not listed as a petitioning creditor; 
instead, Lyon’s director of operations signed the petition individually on 
behalf of each DVI Entity.14 Lyon’s director of operations was not an 
officer, director or employee of any DVI Entity at the time, and five of the 
six DVI Entities had been administratively dissolved.15  
In August 2009, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
Florida dismissed the involuntary case with prejudice.16 First, the court 
determined that the DVI Entities were not “real parties in interest” under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 and section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code because they were “just pass through vehicles” that were “created 
solely for purposes of the securitization transactions described above.”17 
The bankruptcy court found that the DVI Entities had no real economic 
interest in the outcome of the case because there was no value in the 
collateralized assets beyond what was owed to the noteholders, citing case 
law indicating that, in a securitization case, the real party in interest is the 
trustee or its servicer.18  
Notably, the bankruptcy court’s “real party in interest” ground for 
dismissal is not founded in the explicit requirements of section 303(b); 
instead the court applied general principles of standing under the 
Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.19 The Third 
Circuit has similarly found that even if all of section 303(b)’s statutory 
elements are met, a bankruptcy court can dismiss an involuntary case if it 
was filed in “bad faith” based on the “equitable nature of bankruptcy,” 
 
12.  Id. at 836–37. 
13.  The involuntary bankruptcy was filed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and transferred to the Southern District of Florida. 
14.  Rosenberg, 414 B.R. at 837–38. 
15.  Id. at 837.  
16.  Id. at 848–49. 
17.  Id. at 841.  
18.  Id. at 841–42 (citing In re Kang Jin Hwang, 396 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008); LaSalle 
Bank N.A. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d 618, 631–34 (D. Md. 2002); and Greer v. 
O'Dell, 305 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2002)).  
19.  Id. 
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reasoning that the “general ‘good faith’ filing requirement” that is 
generally recognized in the voluntary bankruptcy context also applies in 
the involuntary setting.20 Thus, counsel for a creditor contemplating an 
involuntary filing would be well-advised to look beyond the statutory 
language of section 303 to confirm that their filing will be consistent with 
other applicable bankruptcy law. 
Next, the Rosenberg court turned to section 303(b). The bankruptcy 
court found that the petitioning creditors did not hold “separate claims” as 
required by the statute.21 Instead, there was only one claim under the 
guaranty because Lyon was the only entity with rights under the guaranty 
and the only entity with the power to enforce the guaranty obligations.22 
Those facts rendered the petition defective because section 303(b)(1) 
“requires not only that there be three creditors, but also that each of such 
creditors hold a separate claim against the alleged debtor.”23 The court also 
found that the claims were both contingent and subject to a bona fide 
dispute.24 The claim to enforce Rosenberg’s guaranty obligation was “at 
best, inchoate” because no demand for payment had been made and no 
opportunity to cure was provided to Rosenberg, both prerequisites to 
enforcement of the guaranty.25 In addition, there was a bona fide dispute as 
to liability and amount based on inconsistencies between the amount 
claimed to be due under the guaranty in the state court confession of 
judgment case and the amount claimed on the involuntary petition; the 
petitioning creditors actually filed two amended petitions that changed the 
amount allegedly owed based on claimed errors in the prior calculations.26 
The bankruptcy court also noted a dispute as to whether Rosenberg had 
any liability on certain categories of expenses included in the guaranty 
claim calculation.27 The dismissal was affirmed by the district court and 
the Eleventh Circuit.28 
 
20.  In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 334 (3d Cir. 2015). 
21.  Rosenberg, 414 B.R. at 843–44. 
22.  Id. at 844. 
23.  Rosenberg, 414 B.R. at 843.  
24.  Id. at 844–846.  
25.  Id. at 844. 
26.  Id. at 846–848.  
27.  Id. at 846–47.  
28.  DVI Receivables XIV, LLC v. Rosenberg (In re Rosenberg), No. 10–24347 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 
27, 2011), aff’d, 472 Fed. App’x 890 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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II. THE FALLOUT: POST-DISMISSAL LITIGATION  
UNDER SECTION 303(I) 
 
Involuntary bankruptcy is a high-stakes venture because serious 
consequences can flow from an order of dismissal. If an involuntary case 
is dismissed without the petitioning creditors’ consent, the bankruptcy 
court has discretion to award the alleged debtor attorney’s fees and costs 
under section 303(i)(1). If the petition was filed in “bad faith,” the 
bankruptcy court may also award damages under section 303(i)(2), which 
includes punitive damages.29  
The post-dismissal litigation in Rosenberg produced a host of 
interesting issues. Rosenberg sued the DVI Entities, Lyon and others in 
bankruptcy court for costs, attorney’s fees and damages under section 
303(i), and brought claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process 
under state law.30 Early in the case, the bankruptcy court dismissed 
Rosenberg’s state law claims based on constitutional preemption, agreeing 
with the “overwhelming weight of authority” that section 303(i) creates 
the exclusive remedy “to compensate the alleged debtor for all fees, costs 
and damages arising from the filing of the involuntary petition.”31 The 
statute does not preempt state law remedies of non-debtors, though; the 
statute “is silent as to potential remedies for non-debtors harmed by an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition,” which means that “when Congress 
passed the provision it either did not intend to disturb the existing 
framework of state law remedies for non-debtors or (more likely) was not 
thinking about non-debtor remedies at all.”32 In either case, “federal 
preemption does not apply” to preempt state law remedies of non-debtors 
damaged by an improper involuntary petition.33  
 
29.  11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) (2006). 
30.  See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. U.S. Bank, 
N.A. v. Rosenberg, 136 S. Ct. 805 (2016). The bankruptcy court required Rosenberg to file an 
adversary proceeding, rather than proceed under a motion filed in the bankruptcy case, to protect the 
due process rights of parties that were not parties to the bankruptcy case and against whom Rosenberg 
sought fees, costs and damages under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). 
31.  In re Rosenberg, No. 09-13196-BKC-AJC, 2012 WL 1021724, at *7 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 
26, 2012) (citing In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
32. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, 835 F.3d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 2016). 
33.  Id. 
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In another noteworthy decision from the Rosenberg post-dismissal 
litigation, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
determined that a petitioning creditor is entitled to a jury trial in a section 
303(i)(2) case seeking damages based on the creditor’s alleged “bad faith,” 
reasoning that a damages case under section 303(i)(2) is analogous to a 
malicious prosecution case in which the defendant would be entitled to a 
jury trial.34 The district court found that the petitioning creditors were not 
entitled to a jury trial on the section 303(i)(1) fee claim, however, and as a 
result, the district court withdrew the bankruptcy reference from the 
bankruptcy court to conduct a jury trial in district court on the damages 
claim while the parties continued to litigate the fee issues in bankruptcy 
court.35 That decision would have important procedural implications later 
in the case.36  
 
III. FEE AND COST CLAIMS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 303(I)(1) 
 
There is a “rebuttable presumption” that a prevailing involuntary debtor 
is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees; the burden is on the petitioning 
creditors to demonstrate that an award of fees and costs is inappropriate 
under the “totality of circumstances.”37 According to the Ninth Circuit, 
“any petitioning creditor in an involuntary case should expect to pay the 
debtor’s attorney’s fees and costs if the petition is dismissed.”38 Assuming 
that fees are awarded, the bankruptcy court will determine a reasonable fee 
 
34. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, Case No. 12-22275-SEITZ, ECF No. 10 (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 10, 2012).  
35. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), (d) (2005).   
36. See discussion of Bankruptcy Rule 50(b) infra Section IV.  
37. Higgins v. Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 379 F.3d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Ross, 135 B.R. 
230 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). The “totality of the circumstances” could include the merits of the 
involuntary petition, the conduct of the debtor, and any other relevant factor. Higgins, 379 F.3d at 704-
08.  
38.  Higgins, 379 F.3d at 707. Other courts have likewise observed that awarding attorney’s fees 
is generally appropriate in all cases where a debtor successfully defends against an involuntary 
petition. In re Lee, 252 B.R. 565, 566 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (citing In re K.P. Enterprise, 135 B.R. 
174 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992)). Courts have indicated that fees should be awarded even if the evidence 
shows that the petition was filed in good faith. In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 405 B.R. 
192, 214–17 (E.D. Mich. 2009). That is consistent with the plain language of section 303(i), which 
makes a finding of bad faith a precondition to an award of compensatory or punitive damages, but not 
an award of attorney’s fees and costs. 
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by taking into account factors such as the time and labor required, the 
novelty or difficulty of the legal issues presented, and other factors.39  
In Rosenberg, after a bench trial, the bankruptcy court rejected Lyon’s 
argument that only the defunct shell-DVI Entities could be held liable 
under section 303(i) because they were the only entities listed on the 
involuntary petition; the bankruptcy court found that Lyon had acted as the 
DVI Entities’ “agent” in filing the involuntary petition and was therefore 
liable for the filing under general agency principles.40 The bankruptcy 
court held the DVI Entities and Lyon jointly and severally liable for over 
$1 million in fees and costs for the following categories of work: (1) fees 
incurred to obtain the dismissal of the involuntary petition, (2) fees to 
sustain the dismissal on appeal, (3) “fees on fees” incurred in the 
adversary proceeding to recover the first two categories of fees, and (4) 
fees that Rosenberg incurred prosecuting his separate “bad faith” claim for 
damages under section 303(i)(2) in district court.41  
U.S. Bank appealed the bankruptcy court’s fee award to the district 
court and then to the Eleventh Circuit.42 The appeal presented two issues 
of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit: whether section 303(i)(1) 
authorizes a bankruptcy court to award appellate fees, and whether the 
statute authorizes an alleged debtor to recover fees and costs incurred to 
prosecute a bad-faith claim for damages under section 303(i)(2).43 The 
bank also challenged the decision to hold Lyon liable under section 303(i) 
on an agency theory even though Lyon was not listed as a petitioning 
creditor.44  
The Eleventh Circuit determined that Lyon was properly held liable 
under section 303(i) irrespective of agency principles because the evidence 
showed that Lyon was the “de facto” petitioning creditor under the unique 
 
39.  See Am. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Baddock (In re First Colonial Corp.), 544 F.2d 1291 (5th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977) (articulating twelve-factor test for evaluating attorney’s 
fees awards). 
40.  In re Rosenberg, 2012 WL 3990725, at *8 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2012). 
41.  In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d 1254, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2015).  
42. See DVI Receivables XIV, LLC v. Rosenberg, 500 B.R. 174, 177 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (district 
court appeal); In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d 1254 (circuit court appeal). U.S. Bank became Lyon’s 
successor by merger during the litigation.  
43.  Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1264.  
44.  Id. at 1268. 
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facts of the case.45 The court also determined that both challenged fee 
categories — appellate fees and fees incurred prosecuting a claim for 
damages — were recoverable, rejecting the bank’s argument that section 
303(i)(1) only provides for recovery of fees incurred obtaining dismissal 
of the involuntary petition. The court of appeals observed, “while the 
bankruptcy court is the court deciding what is a reasonable attorney’s fee, 
nothing in section 303(i) indicates that a court may award only those fees 
incurred at the trial level” or “precludes appellate fees or limits fees to 
only those incurred before the date of dismissal.”46 The court further 
reasoned with respect to appellate fees that the statute’s legislative purpose 
is to “compensate debtors who obtain a dismissal and successfully defend 
against involuntary bankruptcy litigation, which may or may not end at the 
trial level.”47 
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the bank’s alternative argument that 
appellate fees had to be requested under Rule 38, because “unlike Rule 38, 
the statutory award of fees in section 303(i)(1) has no frivolity 
requirement.”48 On this point, the Eleventh Circuit expressly disagreed 
with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Higgins v. Vortex Fishing System Inc., 
which held that Rule 38 is the sole vehicle to recover appellate fees 
incurred after dismissal of an involuntary petition.49 The Eleventh Circuit 
noted that Higgins was in tension with another Ninth Circuit decision, In 
re Southern California Sunbelt Developers, Inc., which held that a fee 
award under section 303(i) “presumptively encompasses all aspects of the 
[section] 303 action, including proceedings on claims under [section] 
303(i)(2).”50 The Sixth Circuit also disagreed with Higgins in its 
unpublished decision In re John Richards Homes Building Co., which 
 
45.  Id. at 1268-69.  
46.  Id. at 1265.  
47.  Id. While the court determined that the debtor was entitled to fees incurred in pursuit of his 
bad-faith claims under section 303(i)(2), it also found that the bankruptcy court in Rosenberg had 
awarded those fees prematurely as the bad faith litigation had not yet concluded.  The court of appeals 
described this as “an issue of timing” because the “bankruptcy court may grant only ‘reasonable’ 
attorney’s fees under section 303(i)(1). And determining reasonableness necessarily requires 
consideration of the litigation as a whole and the total number of hours reasonably expended.” Id. at 
1267. 
48.  Id. at 1265.  
49.  379 F.3d 701, 709 (holding that an alleged debtor “remains exposed to appellate attorney’s 
fees unless it can be demonstrated that the appeal was frivolous under Rule 38”). 
50.  608 F.3d 456, 463–64 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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concluded that appellate fees can be awarded under section 303(i)(1) since 
the purpose of the statute is to make the debtor completely whole.51 
Consistent with Rosenberg, courts have allowed all sorts of fees and 
costs under section 303(i)(1), including fees incurred obtaining dismissal 
of the involuntary petition, “fees on fees” incurred enforcing a fee award 
under section 303(i)(1), and fees incurred litigating a claim for damages 
under section 303(i)(2).52 A good example of the statute’s impressive 
reach is the Sixth Circuit’s decision in John Richards Homes.53 There, the 
bankruptcy court entered a substantial fee award in favor of the prevailing 
debtor under section 303(i)(1) and later awarded nearly $2 million in 
additional “fees on fees” that the alleged debtor incurred prosecuting the 
first fee award for years after the involuntary petition was dismissed.54 The 
additional fee award included fees incurred participating in the petitioning 
creditor’s own subsequent bankruptcy case, which sought to discharge the 
prior fee award.55  
 
IV. DAMAGE CLAIMS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 303(I)(2) 
 
In a case seeking damages under section 303(i)(2), the fact-finder 
presumes that the petitioning creditor acted in good faith and the debtor 
has the burden of proving “bad faith,” which is the prerequisite to 
awarding damages under the statute.56 This requires the bankruptcy court 
— or the jury, as was the case in Rosenberg — to analyze the “totality of 
 
51.  In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 552 Fed. App’x 401, 407–408 (6th Cir. 2013).  
52.  See In re John Richards Homes Building Co., 405 B.R. 192, 198–200 (E.D. Mich. 2009) 
(collecting case law); In re S. Ca. Sunbelt Devs., Inc., 608 F. 3d 456, 463–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If the 
court finds that the debtor is eligible for an award of fees, then . . . the fee award presumptively 
encompasses all aspects of the [section] 303 action, including proceedings on claims under [section] 
303(i)(2)”); In re Advance Press & Litho., Inc., 46 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984) (“I find 
nothing in the Code or case authority limiting an award to the date of dismissal”); Adell v. John 
Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 552 F. App’x 401, 411 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2136 
(2014) (“[Section] 303(i) authorizes bankruptcy courts to award fees for services rendered in direct 
appeals and in collateral proceedings enforcing a judgment after the dismissal of an involuntary 
petition.”); In re Landmark Distribs., Inc., 195 B.R. 837, 846 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1996); In re Glannon, 
245 B.R. 882, 894 (D. Kan. 2000). 
53.  552 F. App’x 401 (6th Cir. 2013). 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
56.  In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., LLC, 439 F.3d 248, 254 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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the circumstances” surrounding the filing of the involuntary petition, for 
example, whether the petitioning creditors filed the involuntary petition in 
order to exert pressure or otherwise gain an improper advantage in a 
dispute with the debtor, and whether the decision to file the involuntary 
petition was motivated by personal ill-will or malice.57 
The specter of punitive damages is probably the most dangerous arrow 
in the alleged debtor’s quiver, especially in a jury trial setting. “Section 
303(i)(2) expressly authorizes a stand alone award of punitive damages” 
even in the absence of actual damages because it authorizes the court to 
award “any damages proximately caused” by a bad faith filing or punitive 
damages.58 In other words, “the sole precondition” to awarding punitive 
damages “is a showing of bad faith.”59 Still, courts generally require 
something beyond bad faith, such as malicious or “outrageous” conduct, 
before they will assess punitive damages or permit a jury to do so.60  
A creditor considering the extraordinary step of filing an involuntary 
bankruptcy usually (hopefully) will consult with bankruptcy counsel, so 
the creditor’s liability under section 303(i)(2) may turn on their ability to 
prove up an advice of counsel defense. That defense is not available if the 
debtor proves that the involuntary petition was filed for an “improper 
purpose,” e.g., out of personal ill-will or to exert undue pressure over the 
debtor.61 Courts reason that such a creditor would have come to the 
attorney with their improper purpose already in mind, and thus cannot 
 
57.  Id. at 255 (collecting cases and affirming finding of bad faith where, among other things, the 
petitioning creditor was motivated to coerce the debtor into a settlement or destroy its business).  
58.  Sunbelt Devs., 608 F.3d at 465; 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2) (emphasis added). 
59.  Id. 
60.  See, e.g., In re Schloss, 262 B.R. 111, 116–17 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (“unless there is a 
showing that it [the bankruptcy filing] was done with malice, [a] punitive damages award is not 
appropriate”); compare K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. at 184 (declining to award punitive damages where 
creditor’s “conduct, although misguided and recalcitrant, was not malicious or vengeful”) with John 
Richards Homes, 439 F.3d at 258–62 (affirming punitive damages where the petitioning creditor 
“outrageously threatened [the alleged debtor with] criminal prosecution,” contacted other creditors, 
“used improper threats and flaunted his wealth” to cajole them into joining the involuntary filing, and 
even engaged a public relations firm to publicize the bankruptcy). 
61.  By contrast, an “improper use” of the involuntary process occurs when a creditor improperly 
uses the bankruptcy system to obtain an otherwise legitimate goal; for example, filing an involuntary 
bankruptcy as an alternative to traditional state court debt collection remedies. See In re Better Care, 
Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 412-13 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); see also Gen. Trading Inc. v. Yale Materials 
Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1501 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Better Care and distinguishing improper 
use from improper purpose).  
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claim to have relied on their counsel’s advice in pursuing the improper 
course of action.62 In addition, the creditor must prove that it made a 
reasonable inquiry into the debtor’s financial circumstances and fully 
disclosed that information to its attorney in order to claim good faith 
reliance on the attorney’s advice; courts have rejected the advice of 
counsel defense when material information was withheld from counsel.63 
In Rosenberg, the district court conducted a two-phase unprecedented 
jury trial: first a liability phase to determine whether the bank had filed the 
involuntary petition in bad faith; and second, a damages phase in which 
the jury could consider various categories of compensatory damages as 
well as punitive damages.64 After an eleven-day trial, the jury found that 
the bank had acted in bad faith and awarded Rosenberg $1.12 million in 
compensatory damages for lost wages, loss of reputation and “garden 
variety” emotional distress, together with $5 million in punitive damages. 
The district court reduced that award to $360,000 in post-verdict motion 
practice, granting the bank’s requested motion for judgment as a matter of 
law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), which the bank filed 
twenty-eight days after the entry of the damages judgment on the jury’s 
verdict.65  
On cross-appeal from the district court’s order granting the bank’s Rule 
50(b) motion, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and ordered the district court 
to reinstate the jury’s verdict.66 The court of appeals never addressed the 
merits of the district court’s Rule 50(b) order. Instead, in yet another 
decision of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the court determined 
that the bank’s post-judgment motion, while timely under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, was untimely and therefore should have been 
denied under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 9015(c).67 
Bankruptcy Rule 9015(c) incorporates and makes Rule 50(b) applicable in 
 
62.  Better Care, 97 B.R. at 412 (“Where, however, the purpose is improper, the client will 
usually come into the attorney's office with that purpose already formed. It is the purpose which 
constitutes bad faith in such a case and it is the client who is responsible for the purpose.”).  
63.  In re Landmark Distribs., Inc., 189 B.R. 290, 317–18 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995). 
64.  Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables, XIV, LLC, Case No. 12-22275-CIV, 2014 WL 4810348, at 
*1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 818 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 
2016).  
65.  Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, 818 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2016). 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. at 1287-92. 
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bankruptcy cases but with a shorter, fourteen-day deadline.68 The bank 
argued that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) applied because 
the damages case was tried in district court, and the district court had 
agreed with that position.69 But the Eleventh Circuit applied the plain 
language of both sets of rules, Civil and Bankruptcy, as well as a host of 
persuasive authority from other circuits to conclude that the Bankruptcy 
Rules apply in all bankruptcy cases, even cases tried in district court.70 
Because the bank’s post-trial motion was late, the court of appeals 
concluded that it “need not (and, indeed, cannot) address whether the 
motion was correctly decided by the district court on the merits.”71 The 
court vacated the district court order that had incorrectly found the post-
judgment motion to be timely under the FRCP and ordered the district 
court to reinstate the jury’s verdict: an inglorious end to an improvident 
involuntary bankruptcy case.72  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As of publication, the Rosenberg battles continue in Florida and 
elsewhere. The decisions entered to date illustrate that section 303 is a 
landmine where a misstep can cause serious blowback: as of March 2017, 
Rosenberg had obtained fee and cost awards in excess of $1,589,081 and 
his request for an additional award of $2,604,623 in fees and costs was 
pending in bankruptcy court, all in addition to the $6,120,000 bad-faith 
damages judgment.73 Creditors need to carefully consider before putting a 
debtor into an involuntary bankruptcy, and creditors’ counsel needs to be 
sure to understand the requirements and risks under section 303 and advise 
clients accordingly.  
 
68.  Id. at 1287–92. 
69.  Omnibus Order, Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables, XIV, LLC, Case No. 12-22275-CIV, ECF 
No. 259 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2013), rev’d, Rosenberg, 818 F.3d 1287. 
70.  Rosenberg, 818 F.3d at 1287. The court of appeals readily concluded that the damages case 
was a “bankruptcy case” because the claim at issue was created by the Bankruptcy Code itself. Id. 
(“we think it is beyond debate that a case arises under title 11 when it involves a cause of action 
created or determined by the statutory provisions found in title 11.”).  
71.  Id. at 1292. 
72.  Id. at 1293. 
73.  Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, Adv. No. 10-3812-AJC, ECF Nos. 698, 711, 722 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla.). 
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